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Abstract 
We estimate to which extent regulatory measures in the Dutch market have reduced the 
vulnerability of this market to constraints in the cross-border infrastructure with Germany, 
which is the largest Dutch neighbouring market. We measure this vulnerability by the degree 
the markets are integrated, i.e. to which extent the gas prices differ between the Dutch market 
(Title Transfer Facility or TTF) and the German market (NetConnectGermany or NCG). The 
constraints are measured through the utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure. We find 
evidence that the introduction of a market-based balancing regime together with the 
obligation to deliver all gas on the TTF on 1 April 2011 reduced the impact of the utilisation 
the Dutch-German cross-border infrastructure on the differences in prices between these 
countries. 
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After the start of the liberalisation of gas markets in Europe in the 1990s, reducing 
infrastructure barriers and enhancing access to the infrastructure have been major challenges 
in the development of competitive gas markets. Initially, access to the infrastructure for both 
transport and storage was limited as access rights had been granted to the incumbents on the 
basis of non-market mechanisms. In these allocation mechanisms, such as FCFS and pro-
rata1, the price for capacity was related to infrastructure costs and not to the marginal 
willingness-to-pay of infrastructure users. As a result, cross-border capacity was inefficiently 
used (EC, 2007; NMa, 2007; LECQ, 2011). In addition to these inefficient allocations of 
existing capacity, the level of capacity also frequently formed a constraint for international 
trade (Neumann, Rosellón and Weigt, 2011). 
Over the past year, however, the availability of cross-border gas infrastructure for 
market players increased as a result of extensions in pipeline capacities, both physically and 
virtually. Physical extension of (i.e. investments in) cross-border capacity has been realised, 
for instance, between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Balgzand-Bacton Line, or 
BBL) and on the Belgian-Dutch border through the creation of physical backhaul (GTS, 
2012). Virtual capacity extension has been realised through the introduction of interruptible 
reverse (backhaul) flow services, making it possible to book gas in the reverse direction, for 
instance on the BBL (GTS, 2012). These measures reduced cross-border barriers which 
together with other measures as harmonisation of tariff systems and booking procedures are 
meant to result in stronger economic integration of national gas markets (Growitsch, Stronzik 
and Nepal, 2012). 
Nevertheless, full integration is not yet realised as infrastructure barriers are still 
constraining arbitrage opportunities. On the Dutch border, it appears that most of the 
                                                          
1
 FCFS stands for “first come first served”; ‘pro rata’ is an allocation on the basis of relative demand. 
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technical capacity is contracted on long-term basis, leaving fewer options for other parties to 
benefit from price differences. A reason for the high level of contracting is that firms need to 
be able to adapt supply to changes in demand levels, which is in particular relevant for 
exporters supplying flexibility services (GTS, 2012).  In order to further improve the 
functioning of European gas markets, the EC and the European regulators are considering 
additional measures (CEER, 2011). Measures considered are the introduction of secondary 
markets for capacity, changing the rules for primary allocation in the direction of more 
market-based schemes (i.e. auctioning) and the application of UIOLI mechanisms.2 In 
addition, investments in network extension are viewed to be necessary to enhance 
international trade.  
Besides the regulatory measures directed at the cross-border infrastructure, a number 
of domestic regulatory measures have been taken to increase the liquidity of the market. Key 
regulatory measure in the Dutch market were the abolishment of the obligation of market 
parties to book quality-conversion capacity, the implementation of a market-based balancing 
regime, the obligation on gas traders to deliver all gas on the virtual market place in the high-
pressure network (Title Transfer Facility or TTF) and the implementation of backhaul on the 
BBL. If these measures increase the liquidity of the gas market, one might expect that they 
also reduce the vulnerability of that market to constraints in a specific part of the 
infrastructure. If this appears to be the case, these measures can be seen as contributing to the 
economic integration of neighbouring markets. 
In this paper we estimate to what extent the impact of infrastructure barriers on the 
Dutch borders3 on cross-border price differences have changed under influence of the above 
regulatory measures in the Dutch market. We focus on the Dutch market, as here a significant 
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 UIOLI stands for “use it or lose it”. 
3
 Note that within countries also barriers might exist (see Growitsch, et al. 2012), but these do hardly play a role 
in the Dutch market. 
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domestic supply and demand coincides with a high degree of connection with its 
neighbouring countries (Germany, Belgium and United Kingdom), while a number of 
regulatory measures have been implemented in the recent past. Within the Dutch market, we 
focus on the Dutch-German border, as most of the Dutch imports and exports pass this 
border. In particular, the analysis is directed at the NetConnectGermany (NCG) network in 
Germany because for this network complete time series of gas prices are available. 
By analysing the evolvement of price differences, we measure the development of 
economic integration of markets. This analysis is based on the idea that in a fully integrated 
market, price differences quickly disappear as a result of traders using arbitrage opportunities. 
As a result price differences between countries do not exceed the actual costs of 
transportation, including transaction costs. We analyse how price differences were affected 
by the degree of utilisation of the cross-border transport infrastructure and to which extent 
this relationship changed because of the implementation of regulatory measures within the 
Dutch gas market. 
Our paper is related to papers like Siliverstovs, L’Hégaret, Neumann and von 
Hirschhausen (2005), Cuddington and Wang (2006), Marmer, Shapiro and MacAvoy (2007) 
and Growitsch, Stronzik and Nepal (2012) who analyse the integration of regional gas 
markets. The contribution of our paper is that we use high-frequency (hourly) data on the 
utilisation of infrastructure and on prices in the neighbouring markets in order to estimate the 
impact of regulatory measures on market integration. This approach enables us to determine 
to which extent remaining price differences can be contributed to the degree the infrastructure 
for transport have constituted a barrier for arbitrage and to which extent this relationship is 
affected by regulatory changes. The data on the utilisation of the infrastructure are derived 
from the Transmission System Operator or TSO (GTS, 2012), while data on prices are 
obtained from Bloomberg. 
5 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical relationship 
between cross-border infrastructure constraints and prices on both sides of the constraints. 
Before presenting our empirical model in Section 4, the interconnection between the Dutch 
and the German gas market over the past years is briefly described in Section 3. Section 5 
gives the results of the econometric analysis and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Infrastructure constraints, liquidity of gas markets and gas prices  
Economic integration of gas markets might generate several benefits. Stronger 
economic integration reduces the impact of supply constraints, resulting in less scarcity rents 
and lower prices for gas users in otherwise constrained regions. In addition, stronger 
integration might also reduce, ceteris paribus, the market shares of players, reducing the 
market power of incumbents and, hence, decreasing the mark-ups because of more intensive 
competition. As the demand for gas is inelastic (Bernstein and Madlener, 2011), the above 
two types of benefits are mainly distributional effects from producers to consumers. In 
addition, stronger integration might result in an efficiency effect if it shifts the supply curve 
to the right as fields with relatively low marginal costs are becoming more available. We 
focus, however, on the impact of integration on price differences. 
In a non-constrained, fully integrated market the Law of One Price (LOOP) holds, 
implying that prices in all regions of that market are equal (i.e. absolute LOOP) or that they 
move in the same direction (i.e. relative LOOP). If transport of goods is not costless, price 
differences between regions may exist in such a market, but they do not exceed the costs of 
transportation and other transaction costs: 
ijiijiji TCPPTCPP ≤−≤− ;          (1) 
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where the difference in price (P) between market i and market j does not exceed the costs of 
transportation from j to i, and vice versa. In such a market prices move in the same direction, 
driven by the same common factors (Siliverstovs et al., 2005). If, however, barriers 
(constraints) between regional markets do exist, prices in these markets are not directly 
related to each other anymore and, as a result, they may show diverging patterns for a period 
of time (Marmer et al., 2007). Indirect relationships might of course still occur if the regional 
markets are connected to common third markets or if there are common drivers, such as 
weather conditions. 
The impact of the existence of barriers on prices in regional markets fundamentally 
differs from the impact of costs of transportation. The latter refer to actual costs, while a 
barrier does not directly refer to costs but to the impossibility to realise arbitrage benefits. 
Note that costs of transportation reflect cross-border price differences if transportation is 
allocated through an auction mechanism. Even in such cases, transport costs need not be fully 
equal to cross-border differences if cross-border trade is hampered  by imperfect information, 
as is shown for European electricity markets by Gebhardt and Höffler (2013). In the gas 
market, however, the prices for cross-border capacity are based on the costs of the network 
operator while also being subject to regulatory overview. These costs of transportation might 
also include costs of quality conversion. On top of these costs, traders may have to make 
some transaction costs, making full price harmonisation not efficient. As these costs can be 
considered to be fairly constant over time, we may ignore them in our analysis. 
We are interested in the impact on prices of constraints in the cross-border flows 
because of a fully utilised infrastructure. In that case, price convergence through cross-border 
flows is hindered. So, if Pi – Pj > TCji and if the infrastructure to import from country j to 
country i is fully utilised, this price difference will not be reduced through arbitrage. Note 
that the causality between regional price differences and utilisation of infrastructure is 
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bidirectional: the more benefits can be realised (i.e. the larger regional price differences), the 
sooner a connecting infrastructure is fully utilised.  If differences in prices between regions 
increase, for instance due to a supply shock in one region, the utilisation of the infrastructure 
increases as a result of traders searching for arbitrage profits. This implies that one has to 
control for possible endogeneity effects in the econometric analysis. 
We elaborate on previous papers analysing the degree of integration of gas markets on 
the basis of price differences between countries or hubs. Several authors have found evidence 
for integration between markets. Siliverstovs et al. (2005) find, on the basis of a cointegration 
analysis on data from the early 1990s to 2004, that the European and Japanese gas markets 
were integrated in the long term, because of the presence of similar long-term contract 
structures and oil-price indexation. Although cointegrated, short-term price differences did 
exist as a result of fluctuations in transportation costs as well as the use of different types of 
reference oils applied in the oil-price indexation contracts. Regarding the relationship 
between the European markets and the US gas markets, the authors find that these markets 
were not integrated as arbitrage was hardly possible between these regions, while there were 
neither common drivers behind the gas prices. Compared to Europe, in the US gas prices 
were already more determined in competitive gas markets, while in Europe gas prices were 
more linked to the oil price. Marmer et al. (2007), however, argue that the US gas market 
consists of three relatively isolated regional markets: the Northeast, Midwest and California. 
Demand shocks in one of these regional markets appeared not to result in sufficient price 
adjustments in other regions. Cuddington and Wang (2006) also find different regional 
markets within the US. 
For the German gas market, Growitsch et al. (2012), using a cointegration and a time-
varying coefficient approach, find that the two major trading hubs (NCG and GASPOOL) 
and the Dutch TTF market are reasonably well integrated. Nevertheless price differences do 
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occur which cannot be explained by transportation costs, i.e. the exit and entry charges 
imposed in the entry-exit system of the gas networks. Hence, these authors conclude that 
capacity constraints between these markets still hinder the realisation of perfect arbitrage, in 
particular between the two German hubs. For the relation between the German and the Dutch 
markets, the authors conclude that they are increasingly integrated: prices between NCG and 
TTF appear to adjust within one trading day.  
Our analysis differs from the above studies as we focus on the impact of regulatory 
measures to increase the liquidity of the domestic market on the impact of the cross-border 
constraints on price differences. By increasing the liquidity of a gas market, these measures 
also reduce the vulnerability of that market to constraints in a specific part of the 
infrastructure as in a liquid market traders are better able to quickly respond to changes in 
market circumstances (Cuddington and Wang, 2006; LECG, 2011). Neuman and Siliverstovs 
(2005), for instance, find differences in prices between unconstrained markets which might 
be due to illiquidity of one those markets. Consequently, if the above regulatory measures 
increase liquidity of the gas market, they indirectly contribute to the economic integration of 
the neighbouring markets.  
In the recent years, a number of regulatory measures have been taken to increase the 
liquidity of the Dutch gas market (Table 1). A key regulatory measure in the Dutch market 
was the abolishment of the obligation of market parties to book quality-conversion capacity 
as of July 1, 2009. In the past, a shortage in conversion capacity hampered the integration of 
the high-calorific natural gas (H-gas) and the low-calorific natural gas (L-gas) market (NMa, 
2007). Another measure which is perceived to improve the liquidity of the wholesale market 
is the implementation of a market-based balancing regime since April 1, 2011. In the same 
period, several institutional changes occurred in the German market. After the introduction of 
an entry-exit system in October 2007, several networks pooled which resulted in two network 
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areas for H-gas and only one for L-gas. The two German H-gas networks are NCG and 
GASPOOL; the former covers the southern part of Germany and the latter the northern part. 
Table 1. Institutional changes in the Dutch and German gas market, 2006-2011 
 
Date of implementation Dutch market German market 
1 December 2006 Connection with the UK market 
(BBL) 
 
1 October 2007  Entry-exit system between 
19 zones in Germany 
1 July 2008 The Dutch TSO (Gasunie) acquires the GUD network in 
Germany 
1 October 2008  NetConnect Germany (NCG) 
results from pooling of areas 
of E.ON and Bayernets 
1 July 2009 Abolishment of the obligation 
to book quality-conversion 
capacity 
 
1 October 2009  NCG network is extended 
with GRTgaz Deutschland, 
ENI and GVS 
1 October 2010 Backhaul on BBL  
1 April 2011 New balancing regime; 
Obligation to deliver gas on the 
TTF instead of GOS 
NCG network is extended 
with Thyssengas 
  
We expect that the introduction of these measures influenced the liquidity of the gas markets 
and, hence, how vulnerable these markets are to cross-border bottlenecks. The abolishment of 
the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity implies that, for instance, constraints in the 
H-gas infrastructure not only affect the H-gas market, but also the L-gas market. In other 
words, a consequence of this measure is that shocks in demand or supply are diffused over a 
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larger market which reduces its impact. In addition, the introduction of the market-based 
balancing regime as well as the obligation to deliver all gas on the TTF also make the gas 
market more liquid, as the volume and number of trades are raised, resulting in a lower 
vulnerability to cross-border constraints. The implementation of backhaul on the BBL, 
however, has a different effect as this measure makes the Dutch market more closely 
connected to a different market, i.e. the UK gas market. As a result, this measure raises the 
interdependence of Dutch and British gas prices, which in turn might result in greater 
differences between the Dutch and German prices. 
3. The Dutch gas market and its cross-border connections 
A characteristic phenomenon of the Dutch market is the presence of the largest swing field in 
Northwest Europe (the “Groningen field”) and a number of small fields, both onshore and 
offshore. Because of the Groningen field, the Dutch gas industry is able to export flexibility 
to the neighbouring countries. The Dutch gas network is connected to the networks in 
Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The connection with German is used both for 
import and export, while the other two connections are only used for export (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Net flows between the Dutch market and the markets in Germany, the United 














The net flows to Germany, defined as Dutch export minus Dutch imports, have a seasonal 
pattern. During winter time, exports exceed imports, while during summer time imports 
exceed exports, which results from the fact that mainly the export is strongly seasonally 
driven. 
Import of gas consists only of H-gas from the Gasunie Deutschland (GUD) network. 
This gas is partly used by industrial consumers, including electricity companies, while the 
other part is re-exported. The latter implies that the Dutch network is also used as a transit 
network, needed to bring gas from for instance Russia to the United Kingdom. These transit 
flows are less temperature related than the domestic demand by residential users. Export 
flows of in particular of L-gas show a strong seasonal pattern (Figures 2 and 3). Import flows 
are more flat during a year. 
Figure 2. Utilisation of the Dutch export infrastructure for H-gas to the NCG network 


























In quantitative terms, the Dutch-German border is far more important than the Dutch-Belgian 
border and the Dutch-UK border. The highest export flow of L-gas to Germany in 2011 was 
approximately 40 GW, which was about twice as big as the highest export flow to Belgium. 
For H-gas the respective amounts are 30 (Germany) and 15 (Belgium) GW, while the export 
of H-gas to the United Kingdom peaked at 15 GW in 2011. For the import of H-gas, the 
Dutch-German is even more important: the highest import in 2011 was about 30 GW, while 
through the Dutch-Belgian border no more than 5 GW per hour was exported.  
The capacity to import from Germany has significantly increased over the past years: 
in 2006 the capacity was 30 GW and in 2011 it reached the level of more than 70 GW. The 
import entirely comes through the GUD network in the north. This increase in physical 
capacity did not coincide with higher levels of import: these levels remained within the range 
of 15 to 30 GW. The capacity to export to Germany stayed fairly stable, both for H-gas and 
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for L-gas (Figures 2 and 3). For both the import and the export infrastructure holds that the 
available capacity was almost fully booked, in particular in most recent years.  











Figure 5. Difference in the spread between high and low gas prices in the Dutch market 












Looking at the price differences between the Dutch market (TTF) and the German 
market (NCG), it seems that both markets have become more integrated because of the 
decline in these differences over the past years. In 2006 significant differences in prices 
existed, but gradually these differences have become smaller. This holds both for the 
differences between the high-prices on TTF and NCG (Figure 4) and the spreads between the 
high and low prices on both networks (Figure 5). 
Figure 6. Utilisation of Dutch export infrastructure for H-gas to the NCG network and 









It also appears that the cross-border infrastructure is increasingly efficiently used: in 
2011 there were less hours showing price differences while the infrastructure is not fully used 
compared to a number of years ago (Figures 6 and 7). During those hours, traders apparently 
face restrictions in using the infrastructure in order to benefit from arbitrage opportunities. 
Nevertheless, in 2011 price differences still frequently occurred which might be caused by 
remaining bottlenecks in using the infrastructure. 
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Figure 7. Utilisation of Dutch export infrastructure for L-gas to the NCG network and 











4. Empirical model and data 
We estimate GARCH models to estimate the influence of infrastructure constraints on price 
differences.4 We estimate two different models. In the first model the dependent variable is 
the difference in maximum daily spot price on the Dutch market (TTF) and on the German 
market (NCG). In the second model the dependent variable is the difference in the spread (i.e. 
the highest daily price minus the lowest daily price) between both markets. For both models 
we use the same set of explanatory variables.  
The infrastructure constraint is included by the maximum daily capacity utilisation. 
We define the utilisation of infrastructure (U) as the ratio (in %) between the total allocated 
capacity and total available capacity on the borders with the neighbouring countries:  
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BNINFNU −+=         (2) 
where t is the suffix for days.5 The total available capacity is based on firm capacity (FC), 
which is the capacity allocated to market parties under firm conditions (GTS, 2012). Total 
allocated capacity consists of both firm (FN) and interruptible (IN) nominations.6 For 
unidirectional clusters, we net the interruptible forward with the backhaul nominations (BN). 
After all, backhaul results in lower net flows. For bidirectional clusters, this is not needed as 
here no backhaul takes place. Since we want to analyse the relationship between gas prices on 
network level, we measure the utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure on network level 
as well, aggregating the data on cluster level.7   
We include the utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure between TTF and NCG 
for export of L-gas and H-gas (UEX).8 We also include the net cross-border flow of gas (L-gas 
+ H-gas in GW) to and from Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium as exogenous 
variables. The latter variables are included to control for the effects of trade in gas between 
all Dutch trading partners on the price of gas in the Netherlands. We expect that these flows 
negatively influence price differences. Note that these variables are lagged one period to 
avoid possible biases due to reverse causation.9 In addition we include dummies for months 
(Mi) to capture seasonal patterns. Moreover, we make a distinction between capacity 
                                                          
5
 Note that gas prices are only available on working days, as exchanges and OTC trading places are closed on 
weekends and bank holidays. Therefore, we estimate the infrastructure utilisation also per day. Since we want to 
know whether an infrastructure is congested, we use the maximum hourly value per day 
6
 These data are measured at the level of clusters, which might combine several entry and/or exit points. Note 
that the maximum capacity of a cluster might be lower than the aggregate capacity of the related entry/exit 
points.  
7
 The Dutch gas network is connected to the neighbouring networks through a number of entry and exit points. 
These points are grouped together in about 10 clusters. As the network is distinguished in a L-gas and a H-gas 
part, there are also separate clusters for L-gas and H-gas and also for Groningen-gas or G-gas and G+-gas. See 
GTS (2012) for more details. 
8
 Note that here is no imports of gas from NCG. 
9
 Including contemporaneous explanatory variables using IV yields similar results. However finding valid and 




utilization of L-gas and H-gas connections. What we have described above is the base model 
for price differences (in euro/MWh) and differences in the spread of gas prices (in 















11111111111   (3) 
Finally, we do not include transportation costs since these costs are rather stable 
within a year as is explained in Section 2.10 The base model for the difference in the spread 
replaces the price difference Pttf-ncg with the difference in the spread Sttf-ncg.  
For both versions of the base model we introduce alternative models to analyse the 
effect of the regulatory changes on the impact of cross-border constraints on price differences 
as well as differences in the spread between TTF and NCG prices. In these alternative 
models, we include dummies (Di) and interaction terms with all explanatory variables in 
order to measure the effect of the regulatory measures. The regulatory measures considered 
are (see also Table 1): 
1. As from July 1, 2009 the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity is abolished 
(dummy D2). 
2. On October 1, 2010 interruptible reverse (backhaul) flow service is introduced (dummy 
D3). 
3. O April 1, 2011 a market-based balancing regime is introduced as well as the obligation 
to deliver all gas on the TTF (dummy D4). 
The mean-equation model for the difference in maximum spot prices is as follows: 
                                                          
10
 Transportation costs refer to the fees charged by the network operators for the several cross-border points. 






















































































  (4) 
Again, for the second model we replace the maximum price difference with the difference in 
the price spread, denoted as Sttf-ncg. 
In the base models and in the alternative models the variance equation is a 
GARCH(1,1) model, and we assume that the residuals do not have a normal (Gaussian) 
distribution because the error distribution is fat-tailed (a higher than normal probability of 
extreme events) as is often observed in finance and commodity markets. The hypotheses are 
that the regulatory measures led to reduced differences in both the highest daily prices and 
the spread (i.e. highest minus lowest price) between the Dutch gas market and the German 
gas market. These hypotheses can be tested from parameters β2, β3 and β4 and χ2, χ3 and χ4. 
Table 2. Differences in maximum daily gas prices (TTF minus NCG), summary 
statistics for various samples based on policy changes 
 
 Jun 2007 –  
Jun 30, 2009 
Jul 1, 2009 – 
Sep 31, 2010 
Oct 1, 2010 – 
Mar 31, 2011 
Apr 1 2010 – 
Dec 31, 2011 
Mean -0.268 -0.076 -0.101 -0.159  
Median -0.150 -0.050 -0.100 -0.150  
Standard Deviation 0.963 0.398 0.226 0.448  
Skewness 1.096 -0.906 0.966 5.564  
Kurtosis 18.525 6.899 5.881 57.032  




Table 2 shows that, on average, NCG prices exceed TTF prices. The biggest 
difference of -0.268 euro/MWh is reported in the first sample (June, 2007 - June 30, 2009) 
before the first policy came into effect. Over time the price difference steadily decreases to -
0.159 euro/MWh after April 1, 2010. A similar pattern is observed for the median price 
difference. The standard deviation reaches its lowest value in the period between Oct 1, 2010 
and Mar 31, 2011. The gas price difference shows a long right tail (positive skewness) 
especially since April, 2010, and the distribution of the price difference is peaked relative to 
the normal distribution (kurtosis coefficient > 3) for all periods. The average spread of the gas 
prices between the Dutch and the German market steadily decreases from 0.618 euro/MWh 
before July 1, 2009 to 0.091 euro/MWh after April 1, 2010 as Table 3 indicates. The 
distribution of the spread is positively skewed and is relatively peaked in most of the sample. 
Table 3. Differences in daily spread (TTF minus NCG), summary statistics for various 
samples based on policy changes 
 
 Jun 2007 –  
Jun 30, 2009 
Jul 1, 2009 – 
Sep 31, 2010 
Oct 1, 2010 – 
Mar 31, 2011 
Apr 1 2010 – 
Dec 31, 2011 
Mean 0.618 0.227 0.191 0.091  
Median 0.450 0.150 0.100 0.050  
Standard Deviation 0.941 0.447 0.373 0.472  
Skewness 3.273 -0.975 2.834 2.950  
Kurtosis 23.260 19.828 16.786 27.709  
Observations 508 314 125 188  
 
Autocorrelations of the maximum price differences suggest dependence in the mean, 
and the autocorrelations of the squared price differences reveal dependence in volatility (see 
Table 4). The former observation leads us to assume an AR(1) process in the mean equation, 
while the latter observation justifies the use of GARCH models. Table 5 indicates that there is 
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also dependence in the mean and volatility for the difference in the price spread between the 
Dutch gas market and the German gas market. 
Table 4. Autocorrelations of the differences in maximum daily gas prices (TTF - NCG) 
and squared differences in maximum daily gas prices, sample period: June 2007 – 
December 2011 (1135 observations) 
 
Lags Price differences  Squared price differences 
1 0.385* 0.165* 
2 0.347* 0.117* 
3 0.243* 0.078* 
4 0.187* 0.038 
5 0.179* 0.036 
6 0.165* 0.033 
7 0.165* 0.033 
8 0.184* 0.026 
9 0.223* 0.044 
10 0.214* 0.044 
* Significantly different from zero at approximately the 5% 





Table 5. Autocorrelations of the differences in spreads (TTF - NCG) and squared 
differences in spreads, sample period: June 2007 – December 2011 (1135 observations) 
 
Lags Price differences  Squared price differences 
1 0.224* 0.066* 
2 0.184* 0.050 
3 0.116* 0.009 
4 0.152* 0.028 
5 0.181* 0.025 
6 0.109* 0.030 
7 0.183* 0.067* 
8 0.218* 0.262* 
9 0.189* 0.045 
10 0.095* 0.000 
* Significantly different from zero at approximately the 5% 




We apply GARCH models to the differences in daily gas prices in the Netherlands (TTF) and 
Germany (NCG) over the period June 2007 – December 2011. We use a mean equation (3) 
that includes a constant, month dummies, lagged net gas flows, lagged maximum daily 
utilization rates for exports of L-gas and H-gas, policy dummies with interaction terms, and 
an AR(1)–term as is suggested by the autocorrelations in Table 4 and 5 above. Using lagged 
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variables ensures that the explanatory variables are predetermined, so we do not have to 
worry about the endogeneity bias. 
5.1 Testing 
Applying the ARCH LM-test on ordinary least squares estimates shows that the null of no 
serial correlation of volatility is strongly rejected for lags up to order 10 and higher (at 1% 
significance levels), whereas the null in the price spread model is rejected for 8 lags and 
higher. So, we apply GARCH models instead of ordinary least squares.  
 We assume that the residuals do not follow a normal distribution. Applying the 
likelihood-ratio test to test the null of normally distributed errors against both the generalized 
error distribution and the t-distribution clearly rejects the null (χ2(1) exceeds 480 in all four 
models). With t-distributed errors the log likelihood (ln L) for all models is higher than 
assuming that the errors follow a generalized error distribution.11 So, we estimate the models 
assuming that the errors are t-distributed.12 The parameter for the t-distribution is about 3.3 
for the price difference model and even lower for the spread difference model. These 
estimates which are shown in the tables in the next section suggest that the error distribution 
is fat tailed.13  
 Testing reveals that the models are not covariance stationary, so we estimate Integrated 
GARCH(1,1) models. The results will be presented in the next section. The ARCH LM test 
indicates that there is no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to any order in the 
standardized residuals for the base models and the alternative models including policy 
dummies. This is confirmed by the Ljung–Box Q–statistic of the standardized squared 
residuals up to any lag. From these tests we conclude that the volatility model is adequate.  
                                                          
11
 Obviously this is confirmed by Akaike’s Information Criterium (AIC = 2k – 2 ln L, where k is the number of 
parameters which is the same for the generalized error distribution and the t-distribution). 
12
 The estimates in case the errors follow a  generalized distribution are in Tables B3 and B4 in Appendix B. 
13
 Note that the t-distribution approaches the normal if the tail parameter gets infinitely large. 
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5.2 Estimation results 
The sample period is June 2007- December 2011. The results are presented in Table 6 for the 
model for price differences and Table 7 for the model with the differences between the 
spread. Before we discuss the effect of the regulatory measures introduced in the sample 
period, we note that in the model with policy dummies, higher flows of gas between the 
Netherlands and Germany lowers the maximum price difference between TTF and NCG 
prices the next day. Trade between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and Belgium 
increases the price difference between TTF and NCG prices. In the models with policy 
dummies, trade between the Netherlands and Germany also has a negative effect on the 
difference in the TTF spread and the NCG spread.14 The difference between the spreads is not 
affected by trade between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and Belgium. Seasonal 
patterns are observed in all specifications. 
The focus in this paper is on the effects of the various regulatory measures 
implemented in the sample period by introducing 0-1 dummies and interaction terms (see 
Section 4 above). The effects of these measures are based on interpreting the coefficients of 
the interaction terms of the dummies and the export capacity utilization variables for H-gas 
and L-gas. It should be noted that the regulatory measures remain in affect also after a new 
measure has been implemented. So, a new policy does not replace old policies. This implies 
that, for instance, the value of D2 is zero before July 1, 2009 and 1 on July 1, 2009 until the 
end of the sample. In October 1, 2010 another policy is implemented. So D3 becomes 1 on 
October 1, 2010 until the end of the sample. In this period also D2 equals 1. The implication 
is that the coefficients for the interaction terms measure the impact of the regulatory measures 
on the impact of cross-border constraints on both price differences (Table 6) and differences 
in the spread (Table 7). 
                                                          
14
 These estimation results are reported in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. 
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Table 6. Results for the maximum hourly difference between TTF and NCG prices with 
t-distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 (month dummies and net trade 
coefficients are not reported) 
 AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation     
Constant -0.075 0.084 -0.452*** 0.127 
D2 (=1 since July 1, 2009)   0.457*** 0.126 
D3 (=1 since October 1, 2010)   0.550*** 0.151 
D4 (=1 since April 1, 2011)   -0.497*** 0.158 
Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1) 0.227*** 0.076 0.255 0.192 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   0.015 0.219 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.397* 0.220 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.135 0.241 
Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1) 0.321*** 0.114 -0.084 0.230 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.052 0.325 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   0.843*** 0.290 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.747** 0.310 
AR(1) 0.348*** 0.022 0.280*** 0.023 
Variance equation     
1α , ARCH(1) 0.129*** 0.010 0.131*** 0.010 
1λ , GARCH(1) 0.871*** 0.010 0.869*** 0.010 
Tail parameter t 3.377*** 0.171 3.320*** 0.163 
Observations 1133  1133  
Log likelihood -521.704  -481.121  
*** significant at 1%     
** significant at 5%     




Table 7. Results for the difference in the spread between TTF and NCG prices with t-
distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 (month dummies and net trade coefficients 
are not reported) 
 AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation     
Constant -0.352*** 0.100 0.139 0.158 
D2 (=1 since July 1, 2009)   0.379** 0.147 
D3 (=1 since October 1, 2010)   0.013 0.207 
D4 (=1 since April 1, 2011)   0.029 0.221 
Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1) 0.318*** 0.080 0.684*** 0.222 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.612** 0.242 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   0.053 0.299 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.311 0.342 
Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1) 0.245* 0.143 0.540* 0.315 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -1.115*** 0.418 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.013 0.399 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.529 0.426 
AR(1) 0.183*** 0.022 0.104*** 0.022 
Variance equation     
1α , ARCH(1) 0.069*** 0.007 0.056*** 0.006 
1λ , GARCH(1) 0.931*** 0.007 0.944*** 0.006 
Tail parameter t 3.000*** 0.113 2.834*** 0.092 
Observations 1133  1133  
Log likelihood -731.334  -675.335  
*** significant at 1%     
** significant at 5%     




The results lead to the following conclusions about how the regulatory measures change the 
impact of a 1%-point increase in export capacity utilization (for H-gas and L-gas separately) 
on maximum gas price differences (Table 6) and on differences in the spread between the 
Netherlands (TTF) and Germany (NCG) (Table 7):  
• The direct impact of infrastructure capacity utilization on the maximum hourly price 
difference between the Dutch and the German gas market is absent once we include the 
policy dummies and the interaction terms with infrastructure capacity utilization. Without 
these policy dummies and interaction terms (the base model) an increase in the maximum 
capacity utilization export infrastructure increase the price difference reduced by 0.227 
euro/MWh for H-gas and 0.321 euro/MWh for L-gas. Looking at the difference in the 
spreads, the direct impact of infrastructure capacity utilization is positive (note that the 
results between the base model and the alternative model with dummies and interaction 
terms are not statistically significant). 
• After the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity is abolished on July 1, 2009 
(dummy D2=1), the impact of a rise in the maximum capacity utilisation of exports of H-
gas and L-gas to Germany (NCG) on the difference between TTF and NCG prices has not 
changed. The effect of a higher maximum capacity utilisation of exports of H-gas and L-
gas on the difference in the spread in this period, however, is strong: -0.612 euro/MWh 
for H-gas and -1.115 euro/MWh for L-gas.  
• After the introduction of interruptible reverse (backhaul) flow services on BBL on 
October 1, 2010, a higher level of maximum capacity utilisation of exports of H-gas has 
lowered the price difference between TTF and NCG for H-gas by 0.397 euro/MWh (only 
significant at 10%). For L-gas, however, this regulatory measure raised the price 
difference by 0.843 euro/MWh. Possible, the increased linkage to the UK market has 
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reduced the integration with the German market. Looking at the differences in spreads, 
however, we do not find an effect of this regulatory measure. 
• The joined introduction of regulatory measures regarding the gas balancing regime and 
the obligation to sell all gas on the TTF had no significant effect on the price difference 
resulting from a higher infrastructure capacity utilization for H-gas. For the L-gas 
infrastructure, however, we find a relatively strong negative effect. After the 
implementation of these measures, the impact of an increase in the maximum capacity 
utilization of L-gas export infrastructure price difference reduced by -0.747 euro/MWh 
(significant at 5%). Looking at the spreads, we do not find statistically significant effects. 
6. Conclusions 
Comparing the daily gas prices between the Dutch market (TTF) and the German market 
(NCG), we find that these markets have become more integrated over the past years. The 
difference between the maximum daily gas prices initially drops over time, but after October, 
2010 it tends to increase again. However, at the end of 2011 the price difference of -0.159 
euro/MWh is lower than it was in June 2007 (-0.268 euro/MWh). Comparing the difference 
in the spread (high-low prices), we observe a steady drop from 0.618 euro/MWh to 0.091 
euro/MWh in 2011. . 
In order to integrate the national gas market into regional European markets, a number 
of regulatory measures have been taken. These measures are not only directed at the cross-
border infrastructure, but also at the functioning of the domestic wholesale markets. In this 
paper we analyse to which extent a number of regulatory measures in the Dutch gas market 
have contributed to the integration with the German market. 
Using daily data on cross-border infrastructure utilisation and prices, we find some 
evidence that the abolishment of the obligation to book quality-conversion capacity on 1 July 
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2009 as well as the introduction of a market-based balancing regime and the obligation to 
deliver all gas on the TTF on 1 April 2011 have contributed to making the Dutch market less 
vulnerable to cross-border constraints. Hence, these measures appear to have raised the 
ability of market players to respond more quickly to price differences between the Dutch and 
German market. Regarding the implementation of backhaul on the BBL, we conclude that 
this measure has reduced the integration of the Dutch and German, apparently because the 
Dutch market became more closely related to the UK market. 
If we control for policy measures, by incorporating dummies and interaction terms, 
the direct impact of infrastructure capacity utilization on the maximum hourly price 
difference between the Dutch and the German gas market is absent. This implies that the 
degree of capacity utilization has no influence anymore on price differences as a result of the  
implemented regulated measures. This observation does, however, not hold true for the 
impact of infrastructure capacity utilization on the difference in the spread between the Dutch 
and the German gas prices. Even with the policy measures included, an increase in 
infrastructure capacity utilization increases the difference in the spreads. This latter result 
suggests that infrastructure constraints still influence prices despite the increase in liquidity of 
the markets in both countries. Consequently, the economic integration of the Dutch and 
German market can still be improved by either reducing cross-border constraints or by further 
raising the liquidity of the market places. 
We stress the fact that our analysis of the effects of the regulatory measures on market 
integration is done by capturing these measures through dummy variables, implying that the 
results might be distorted because of the influence of other events occurring at the same time. 
Further research could analyse to which extent such events really have taken place. In 
addition, extending our analysis by also paying attention to the utilisation of the cross-border 
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infrastructure with Belgium and the UK could further enhance the understanding of the 
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APPENDIX A: Specification of ARCH models 
ARCH models have been developed to correct for clustered volatility (see Engle, 1982; 
Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson, 1994, generalized to GARCH by Bollerslev, 1986). Neglecting 
the exact nature of the dependence of the variance of the error term conditional on past 
volatility results in loss of statistical efficiency.  
 Defining 2ε t  as the variance of the error term tε  in a generalized regression equation 
where the dependent variable ty is determined by a set of regressors tx , 
 ttt xy εβ +′= ,                          (A.1) 
GARCH models assume that the conditional variance 2σt  (the variance of tε conditional on 
information up to time t-1 changes over time) is affected by conditional variances q periods 
















++= ,                                        (A.2) 
where .0≥λ,0≥α,0α0 ji>  This model is referred to as a GARCH(p,q). Note that with p=0 
the model is an ARCH(q) model. Well–defined conditional variances require that the 
parameters ,α,α0 i  and jλ  are non–negative. The estimate ∑∑ + ji λα ˆˆ  is a measure of 
persistence: the average time for volatility to return to the mean is ( )∑∑ λˆαˆ1/1 ji +− . If the 
estimate for ∑∑ + ji λα ˆˆ is close to unity, the model is not covariance stationary (the process 
is an Integrated GARCH process). In that case the model can be used only to describe short–
term volatility. To test whether volatility is serially correlated over time up to some lag p, 
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first estimate the mean equation (A.1), retrieve the residuals tε , and regress the squared 
residuals on lagged squared residuals up to lag p (this procedure is known as the ARCH LM 
test). 
 If the usual assumption that standard errors εt are Gaussian is violated, quasi–maximum 
likelihood covariances and standard errors as described by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) 





APPENDIX B: Additional estimation results 
Table B1. Results for the control variables in the model for maximum hourly difference 
between TTF and NCG prices with t-distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
M1 -0.086 0.056 0.009 0.057 
M2 -0.100** 0.042 -0.047 0.052 
M3 -0.118*** 0.042 -0.122** 0.056 
M4 -0.169*** 0.052 -0.072 0.063 
M5 -0.221*** 0.065 -0.066 0.078 
M6 -0.184*** 0.063 -0.029 0.076 
M7 -0.171*** 0.066 -0.135* 0.077 
M8 -0.071 0.066 -0.063 0.077 
M9 -0.118* 0.067 -0.040 0.075 
M10 -0.200*** 0.067 -0.456*** 0.073 
M11 -0.074 0.048 -0.144*** 0.046 
Net EX GER(-1) -0.001*** 8.9E-05 -4.3E-04** 1.8E-04 
D2 × Net EX GER(-1)   3.4E-05 2.3E-04 
D3 × Net EX GER(-1)   -0.001** 2.3E-04 
D4 × Net EX GER(-1)   0.001*** 2.2E-04 
Net EX UK(-1) 1.2E-04 1.2E-04 0.001** 2.9E-04 
D2 × Net EX UK(-1)   -0.001*** 3.3E-04 
D3 × Net EX UK(-1)   -7.5E-06 3.0E-04 
D4 × Net EX UK(-1)   0.001** 2.7E-04 
Net EX BEL(-1) 1.5E-05 9.1E-05 0.001*** 2.0E-04 
D2 × Net EX BEL(-1)   -3.5E-04 2.3E-04 
D3 × Net EX BEL(-1)   -0.001*** 2.2E-04 
D4 × Net EX BEL(-1)   3.0E-04 2.5E-04 
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5%     




Table B2. Results for the control variables in the model for the difference in the spread 
between TTF and NCG prices with t-distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
M1 -0.023 0.074 -0.118 0.076 
M2 -0.085 0.060 -0.258*** 0.069 
M3 -0.047 0.057 -0.329*** 0.070 
M4 0.084 0.066 -0.275*** 0.081 
M5 0.153* 0.080 -0.294*** 0.098 
M6 0.141* 0.079 -0.330*** 0.099 
M7 0.144* 0.079 -0.314*** 0.098 
M8 0.175** 0.081 -0.287*** 0.097 
M9 0.199** 0.084 -0.226** 0.099 
M10 0.179** 0.078 -0.088 0.088 
M11 -0.019 0.070 -0.184*** 0.066 
Net EX GER(-1) -1.5E-04 1.1E-04 -0.001** 2.5E-04 
D2 × Net EX GER(-1)   0.001*** 2.9E-04 
D3 × Net EX GER(-1)   -2.6E-04 3.2E-04 
D4 × Net EX GER(-1)   3.2E-04 3.2E-04 
Net EX UK(-1) 0.001*** 1.4E-04 4.3E-04  3.7E-04 
D2 × Net EX UK(-1)   -0.001 4.2E-04 
D3 × Net EX UK(-1)   4.0E-04 3.9E-04 
D4 × Net EX UK(-1)   -7.3E-05 3.8E-04 
Net EX BEL(-1) 2.9E-04*** 1.0E-04 -7.0E-05 2.2E-04 
D2 × Net EX BEL(-1)   1.3E-04 2.4E-04 
D3 × Net EX BEL(-1)   -1.4E-04 2.7E-04 
D4 × Net EX BEL(-1)   2.6E-04 3.2E-04 
*** significant at 1%     
** significant at 5%     






Table B3. Results for the maximum hourly difference between TTF and NCG prices 
with generalized distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 (month dummies and net 
trade coefficients are not reported) 
 AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) AR(1)-IGARCH(1,1) 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation     
Constant -0.061 0.058 -0.453*** 0.076 
D2 (=1 since July 1, 2009)   0.441*** 0.087 
D3 (=1 since October 1, 2010)   0.529*** 0.090 
D4 (=1 since April 1, 2011)   -0.394*** 0.092 
Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1) 0.171*** 0.054 0.344*** 0.127 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.006 0.148 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.436*** 0.127 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.334** 0.154 
Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1) 0.310*** 0.088 -0.149 0.162 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.084 0.213 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   0.998*** 0.177 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.611*** 0.234 
AR(1) 0.386*** 0.016 0.300*** 0.015 
Variance equation     
1α , ARCH(1) 0.100*** 0.009 0.095*** 0.008 
1λ , GARCH(1) 0.900*** 0.009 0.905*** 0.008 
GED parameter 0.794*** 0.022 0.764*** 0.021 
Observations 1133  1133  
Log likelihood -539.022  -489.978  
*** significant at 1%     
** significant at 5%     




Table B4. Results for the difference in the spread between TTF and NCG prices with 
generalized distributed errors, sample period: 2007-2011 (month dummies and net 
trade coefficients are not reported) 
 AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) 
 Base model Alternative model 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Mean equation     
Constant -0.441*** 0.035 0.073 0.079 
D2 (=1 since July 1, 2009)   0.480*** 0.079 
D3 (=1 since October 1, 2010)   -0.022 0.123 
D4 (=1 since April 1, 2011)   -0.112 0.137 
Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1) 0.351*** 0.055 0.663*** 0.110 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.734*** 0.134 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   0.331 0.208 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX H-gas(-1)   -0.376 0.235 
Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1) 0.300*** 0.091 0.716*** 0.178 
D2 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -1.386*** 0.238 
D3 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   0.373 0.237 
D4 × Max Cap Util EX L-gas(-1)   -0.506* 0.279 
AR(1) 0.171*** 0.011 0.141*** 0.014 
Variance equation     
0α , Constant 0.010*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.002 
1α , ARCH(1) 0.082*** 0.020 0.067*** 0.017 
1λ , GARCH(1) 0.891*** 0.020 0.913*** 0.017 
GED parameter 0.746*** 0.026 0.713*** 0.026 
Observations 1133  1133  
Log likelihood -731.426  -670.845  
*** significant at 1%     
** significant at 5%     
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